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The one-way hash function plays an important role in digital signatures and message authentication from the
viewpoint of security. No effective attacking method has been discovered to the algorithm of hash function
standard. In this study, we tried to attack SHA-256 in encryption mode using linear and differential
cryptanalysis to solve a private key. We deduced that an estimate of the private key would require huge known
and chosen plaintexts in both linear and differential cryptanalysis, and that it would be difficult to decipher
SHA-256 in view of the required computation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The one-way hash function plays an important role
in digital signatures and message authentication from
the viewpoint of security [I, 2]. Although there have
been no reports that the previous hash function
standard of 160 output bits SHA-l, which was
introduced in 1995 as a minor change of SHA-O [3],
may compromise security, its security will be
threatened by improvements in the performance of
computers.
In 2002, the National Institute of Standard
Technology (NIST), U.S., Department of Commerce
issued new hash function standards SHA-256,
SHA-384 and SHA-512, having respectively 256, 384
and 512 output bits [4]. The structure of SHA-256,
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SHA-384, SHA-512 adopted a collision intractable
and one-way structure as proposed by
Merkle-Damgard [5]. The algorithm ofSHA-256, 384,
512 were slightly more complicated than that of
SHA-l. Since the algorithms ofSHA-384 or 512 seem
to be essentially the same as that of SHA-256, we
examine only SHA-256 in this paper.
Handschuh et al. attacked SHA-l in encryption
mode using both linear and differential cryptanalysis
[6]. They deduced that an estimate of the private key
would require at least 280 known plaintexts in the
linear cryptanalytic attack and at least 2116 chosen
plaintexts in the differential attack.
Matsui of Mitsubishi Electric Corporation devised
linear cryptanalysis [7], a kind of known plaintext
attack method that made use of bitwise connection of
the exclusive-or between plaintext and ciphertext, and
succeed in breaking on 8-round DES cipher. Sakamura
et al. investigated linear cryptanalysis against AES
cipher [8].
Biham et al. performed differential cryptanalysis in
1993 [9], a kind of chosen plaintext attack method.
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The differential attack is based on the high probability
of certain appearance of difference in plaintext leading
to that in ciphertext.
In this study, we tried to attack SHA-256 in
encryption mode using linear and differential
cryptanalysis to solve a private key, and investigated
the robustness of SHA-256 against linear and
differential cryptanalysis.
ch(x,y,z) =(x 1\ y) EJj (- X 1\ z)
maj(x,y,z) =(x 1\ y) EJj (x 1\ z) EJj (y 1\ z)
rotrn (x) : (x » n) v (x «(32 - n»
L ~56(X) =rotr 2 (x) EJj rotr 13 (x) EJj rotr 22 (x)
L ;56 (x) = rotr6 (x) EJj rotr ll (x) EJj rotr 25 (x)
Fig. 1 Functions in SHA-256
Bitwise logical word operations are defined as
follows:
x /\ y: bitwise logical "and" ofx and y
x V y: bitwise logical "inclusive-or" ofx and y
x E9 y: bitwise logical "exclusive-or" ofx and y
Table 1. ch and mal functions
x y z ch(x,y,z) maj(x,y,z)
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 1
0 0 0 0
0 1 0
0 1
0, I: input, output value (bit).
processing from a-h to a'-h' is shown in Fig. 2 where
only a' and e' among the output variables receive the
essential conversion, and the others shift their
position. For simplicity, we omit the operation of
constant addition here. The whole SHA-256 process
is composed of 64 times repetition of the above
I-step procession.
-x
x«
bitwise logical "complement" ofx
left shift ofx
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x» right shift ofx
2. ALGORITHM OF SHA-256
In SHA-256, 256 bits of input are divided into
eight words (32 bits), a, b, c, d, e,/, g, h. The I-step
action in SHA-256 consists of word-wise operations.
The functions of each word (32 bits) used by
SHA-256 are summarized in Fig. 1. The I-step
,,256Tl=h+~l (e) +ch(e,j,g)
T2 = E56 (a)+maj(a,b,c)
h'=g
g'=/
/'=e
e'=d+Tl
d'=c
c'= b
b'=a
a'= Tl+T2
Fig. 2 Algorithm of SHA-256
a-h denote input words, which a '-h' denote output
words.
We shall treat SHA-256 with encryption mode,
namely by inserting a private key in the plaintext as
the initial value that was introduced by [6], and try
linear cryptanalysis against SHA-256 in this mode by
using linear approximation of the input-and-output
relation.
Firstly, we can see that for the addition of words z
=x+y, the successive probability of the i-th bit
equation Z;=X; ED y; is 2-(;+1) ( 0 ~ i ~ 31 ). The
absolute value of the probability subtracted 1/2 is
called "bias".
Secondly, we show the input-and-output results of
functions ch(x,y,z) and maj(x,y,z) in Table 1. As the
probabilities of equations y=ch(x,y,z), z =ch(x,y,z) hold
3/4 together, their biases are equal to r 2 • For the
function maj, the successive probabilities of
x=maj(x,y,z), y=maj(x,y,z) and z=maj(x,y,z) are all 3/4
(bias= 2 -2). From the expression of a' in Fig. 2, we
use the following linear approximation:
a'; = h; $ e;+6 $ e;+l1 $ e;+25 $ ch(e;, j"g;) $ a;+2
$ a;+13 $ a;+22 $ ma}(a;,b;,c;),
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a b c d e f g h bias
a2 $a13 $a22 bo e6 $ ell $e25 10 ho 2-3
ao r 1
bo r 1
Co r 1
do
Fig. 3. Linear approximation starting from ao
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that leads to a 4-step linear approximation starting
from ao, which is shown in Fig. 3. Its bias is calculated
as 22-I *bch*bmar2*2-2*2"2=2"J by Piling-up Lemma [7].
In the same way, linear approximation:
e'j = d j $ hj $ ej+6 $ ej+ll $ ej+25 $ ch(ei' J;, g;),
leads to a 4-step linear approximation starting from eo
(Fig. 4), the bias of which is the same as that of its first
step.
The defmition in Fig. 2 brings into an equation:
aD' Ell eo' = (TID +T2 0 ) Ell (do +TID) = TID Ell do'
which leads to a 7-step approximation in Fig. 5. The
bias of the last step in Fig. 5 is as same as that of the
first step in Fig. 3. The bias of the whole the 7-steps is
calculated as follows:
bias = 2-2 *2-1 *rl *r1 *2-2 *2-1 *2-3 *26 = 2-5 •
4. DIFFERENTIAL CRYPTANALYSIS
We try to attack SHA-256 in encryption mode,
solving the private key by means of differential
Table 2. Differences by ch and maj functions
x y z ch maj
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0/1 0/1
0 0 0/1 0/1
0 1 0/1
0 0 0/1 0/1
0 0/1 0/1
0 0/1 0/1
0/1
"0", "1" or "Oil" denotes that the difference is always 0,
always 1 or 0 or I with probability 1/2, respectively.
cryptanalysis.
We tabulate the differences of function output
(ch(x,y,z), maj(x,y,z)) depending on the differences of
3-inputs in Table 2. When we alternate anyone of
variables (x, y, z), the value of ch(x,y,z) or maj(x,y,z)
changes with probability 2-1• The difference of the
i+k-th output bit in L:" ' L~S6 changes with
probability I when the ;-th input bit changes
(k=IO,19,30 for ES6 , k=7,21,26 for L~S6 ).
For the addition of words z =x +y, when Xi
changes, only Zj changes with probability 2"1, and also
exactly k-consequentive Zj (; ~ j ~ ; + k -I) changes
with probability with 2-(k+1) because of carrying bits
in addition.
We summarize the probability of differences when
only the i-th bit ofeach word (a-h) changes in Table 3.
We construct a 2-step difference in Fig. 6; the first
step has a probability I due to the characteristic of ch,
while the second step has a small probability due to
the action of L~S6(a) and L~S6 (e).
We make one more expression. To avoid the
influence of the addition process of
~'S6(e)=e Ell e Ell e , we choose an input bit ej whichLJI I 26 21 7
leads to the highest (31-th) bit as output: input bit es,
elO or e24 according to ;+26, ;+21 or ;+7 respectively.
Prolonging the I step differential expression starting
from es upward, we get a 4-step differential expression
starting from bs (Fig. 7). Its probability is calculated as
2-1 *rl *rl *2-5 = r 8 •
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Table 3. Differences by i-th bit of each input word
input output function probability
aj+lO , aj+19 , a j+30 L~56 (a)
G j
maj(a, b, c) r l
aj
bj
b=a
maj(a, b, c) r l
aj
bj
c=b
cj
maj(a, b, c) r l
aj
Cj d=cd j
d j
e=d+T1 r l
e j
aj+26 ,aj +21 ,a j +7 L~56 (e)
ch(e,f, g) r l
a j
ej ej +26 , ej +21 , e j+7 L~56 (e)
ch(e,f, g) r l
ej
J; f = e
ch(e,f, g) r l
a j
J; ch(e,f, g) r
l
ej
g=f
gj
ch(e,f, g) r l
aj
gj
ch(e,f, g) r l
ej
hj
h=g
L 256 r
l
a j Tl =h+ 0 (a)+ch(e,f,g)
hj 2-1I 256ej TI =h+ 0 (a)+ch(e,f,g)
WANG Xiao Don~ et al. / Cryptanalysis of SHA-256
0 b c d e f g h bias
do e 6 EDell EDe25 10 ho r 2
eo r l
10 r l
go r l
ho
Fig. 4 Linear approximation starting from eo
0 b c d e f g h bias
O 2 ED 0 13 ED 022 bo do r 2
°0 eo 2-1
bo 10 r l
Co go r l
do ho r 2
eo 16 $ hI $ 125 go
r l
10 g6$gll$g25 ho r 3
°0 b2 ED b13 $ b22 do 16 $ hi $ 125 h6 $~1 $h25
Fig.S Linear approximation starting from ao Ee eo
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0 b c d e f g h
0 0 0 0 0 131 g31 0
°31 0 0 0 eJl 0 g31 ~I
e 31 0 0 e 6,20,25,31 131 0 ~I
0 6.9.18,20
25,29.31
probability
Fig.6 2-steps difference expression starting from 131' g31 on the bases of the characteristic ofch
"0" means that the input value does not change, and" Xi ", " Xi,} " means that the input value differs in only i-th bit or i andj-th bit
bits ofx,
0 b c d e f g h probability
0 b5 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 c 5 0 0 0 0 0 r 1
0 0 0 d5 0 0 0 0 2-1
0 0 0 0 e 5 0 0 0 2-1
a I2 ,26.31 0 0 0 e I2 ,l6.31 15 0 0 r 5
Fig.7 4-steps difference expression starting from b5
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5. DISCUSSION
The linear cryptanalysis against 7 steps in SHA-256
requires 28(1/4(2-5r 2) known plaintexts to attain the
success rate of 84.1% being calculated by Lemma in
[7], since its bias is estimated as 2-5. Therefore the bias
of the whole 64-steps for SHA-256 is presume.d to be
less than 2--45 «2"5)'1.
Besides the theoretical investigation, we tried to
search for better linear approximate expressions by
means of computer experiment. The search project
started at the bottom line in one of the best 7 step
linear approximations in Fig. 5. The program worked
on the following conditions:
1. the 8 word inputs (a-h) were generated 100,000
times at random.
2. it examined all combinations of I bits in the
output side where I ran over 1-15 while the input
side remained stable as
ao $ b2 $ blJ $ b22 $ do $ 16 $ III
$/25 $h6 $hll $h25
3. a new linear approximation was recorded when
its bias exceeded 2-10 •
However, no new linear approximations were found
by this computer experiment. When we prolong the
linear approximation in Fig. 5 downward, it is difficult
to compose a I-step linear approximation with input
bits (6, 11,25) ofh having a bias at more than 2-14 •
The differential cryptanalysis against 4 steps in
SHA-256 needs 28 chosen plaintexts to solve I-bit
(b5• blO or b24), since its probability is estimated as 2-8
(Fig. 7). Therefore, the probability of the whole
64-steps for SHA-256 is presumed to be less than
r 128 «2"8)16).
We also tried to search for better differential
expressions by computer experiment. The search
project started at the bottom line expression in Fig. 7.
The program worked on almost the same conditions as
in the linear approximation:
1. the 8 word inputs (a-h) were generated 100,000
times at random.
2. it examined all combinations of I bits in the output
side where I ran over 1-15 while the input side
remained stable as
al2 $ a26 $ a'i $ e12 $ e26 $ e31 $ 15 •
3. a new differential expression was recorded when its
probability exceeded 2-10 •
However, this yielded no effective differential
expression because it was difficult to compose a I-step
additional expression with input bits (012,26,31 and
eI2.26,31) having a probability of more than 2-13
prolonging the differential expression in Fig. 7
downward.
The bit expansion functions E 56 , I:56 have a
great influence on decipherment due to the decrease in
bias or probability through addition process for linear
or differential cryptanalysis.
Consequently, we estimate that linear and
differential cryptanalysis against the whole 64 steps in
SHA-256 requires more than 288(1/4(2"45r2) known
plaintexts to attain a success rate of 84.1%, and
differential cryptanalysis requires 2128 chosen
plaintexts, indicating the difficulty of decipherment
against SHA-256 encryption in view of the required
computation. Further careful research is necessary
because there remains much to learn about security
following the proposal of this new hash function
standard SHA-256, 384, 512.
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